Complex Visual Imagery and Cognition During Near-Death Experiences by Batthyany, Alexander
65Journal of Near-Death Studies, 34(2), Winter 2015 © 2015 IANDS
DOI: 10.17514/JNDS-2015-34-2-p65–83.
Complex Visual Imagery and Cognition 
During Near- Death Experiences 
Alexander Batthyány, PhD
 University of Vienna & International  
Academy of Philosophy
ABSTRACT: Near-death experiences (NDEs) entail complex and structured 
conscious experience during conditions known to coincide with rapid loss of con-
sciousness often associated with decline or disruption of the neurological cor-
relates currently held to be causative factors of visual imagery and cognition. In 
this study, 653 NDE reports of cardiac and/or respiratory arrest patients were 
analyzed for unprompted, spontaneous references to quality of conscious visual 
imagery and mentation during an NDE. Results indicate that in a majority of 
NDEs, both figurative and abstract mentation are either preserved or mark-
edly improved during unconsciousness and unresponsiveness in the context of 
respiratory and cardiac arrests. These findings underscore the call to further 
study the mechanisms behind the ‘outliving’ of a conscious sense of selfhood and 
complex, structured visual imagery and cognition during severely deteriorating 
physiological function—and perhaps especially during clinical death.
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Near-death experiences (NDEs) are phenomenologically complex ex-
periences reported by 9–18% of patients who survived health crises 
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of varying severity (Greyson, 1998). Although researchers who con-
ducted early field work (Moody, 1975) may have overestimated or over-
stated the case for a uniform structure and phenomenology of NDEs 
(Belanti, Perera, & Jagadheesan, 2008; Kellehear, 1993; Knoblauch, 
Schmied, & Schnettler, 2001), subsequent studies have confirmed sev-
eral core features often, but not invariably, present during NDEs, such 
as the awareness of being dead, feelings of euphoria and peacefulness, 
a feeling of floating outside one’s body, moving through a tunnel, and 
meeting deceased relatives or nonhuman entities (Athappilly, Grey-
son, & Stevenson, 2006; Belanti et al., 2008). Whereas some of these 
features make for compelling narratives and are often evidential for 
experiencers (San Filipo, 2006), there is little consensus among re-
searchers as to what triggers, causes, or underlies the experience and 
as to what the experience signifies (Agrillo, 2011; French, 2005). 
Individual NDEs may differ in content and structure, but the one 
NDE-defining feature is the presence of conscious self-awareness and 
memory, and often complex imagery and cognition, during severe 
physiological crisis—often at a time during which patients are unre-
sponsive and apparently unconscious. Yet only few researchers have 
looked into the reported quality of mentation during NDEs, and few 
have addressed the implications of the fact that near-death experienc-
ers (NDErs) not only seem to retain a conscious sense of self and struc-
tured cognition but also often report enhanced, rather than dimin-
ished, alertness, imagery, and mentation during their NDEs (Greyson, 
2010; Kelly, Greyson, & Kelly, 2007). Patients may, for example, claim 
heightened mental clarity, vivid sensory imagery, and a clear memory 
of the experience during physiological crises frequently accompanied 
by hypoxia, hypercarbia, metabolic, and drug induced disturbances 
and seizures—that is, during states known to involve severely compro-
mised cerebral function (Agrillo, 2011; Greyson, Kelly & Kelly, 2009). 
For instance, Emily Kelly, Bruce Greyson, and Edward Kelly (2007) 
conducted a questionnaire study with 800 NDErs asking multiple choice 
and narrative questions that specifically addressed changes in visual 
imagery and cognitive function during the experience. In their study, 
a full 80% of experiencers described their thinking during their NDEs 
as “clearer than usual” (45%) or “as clear as usual” (35%); furthermore, 
65% recounted that their thinking during their NDEs was “as logical 
as usual” (36%) or “more logical than usual” (29%; Kelly, Greyson, & 
Kelly, 2007, p. 386). Additionally, according to an earlier study, NDErs 
who reported complex mentation and imagery during their NDEs were 
significantly more often physiologically close to death than those who did 
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not (Owens, Cook, & Stevenson, 1990). In other words, in what appears 
to be at variance with what should be expected by current physicalist 
models of the mind, the more severe the physiological crisis, the more 
likely NDErs are to report having experienced clear and complex cogni-
tive and sensory functioning. 
The observation of intact, or even enhanced, visual imagery and 
mentation during presumed deterioration of structured neuronal func-
tioning converges with two further death-related phenomena of seem-
ingly intact or enhanced sensory and cognitive function in the pres-
ence of physiological crisis, namely terminal lucidity and “mindsight.” 
Terminal lucidity refers to the unexpected return of mental clarity and 
memory shortly before death in patients with a wide variety of debili-
tating chronic mental and neurological disorders such as dementias, 
brain tumors and lesions, and chronic psychoses (Batthyány, 2014; 
Nahm & Greyson, 2009; Nahm, Greyson, Kelly, & Haraldsson, 2012). 
Mindsight refers to the return or the emergence of visual imagery 
during NDEs in subjects who are blind but who, during their NDEs, 
experience visual—and sometimes confirmed veridical—perceptions 
of physical objects and events (Ring, 2001; Ring & Cooper, 1999). Next 
to anecdotes of veridical perception and knowledge acquisition during 
the out-of-body aspect of NDEs, these phenomena are often considered 
to support an “out-of-brain,” that is, dualist interpretation of NDEs 
whereby mind and brain are considered to be ultimately independent 
entities (Facco & Agrillo, 2012; Greyson, 2010; Grossmann, 2008). 
However, the evidential quality of cases of terminal lucidity and 
mindsight currently hardly measures up to the scale of the philo-
sophical implications on the nature and the functional relationship 
between brain and mind at death and dying. For one, both terminal 
lucidity and mindsight are rare occurrences; and secondly, even when 
they occur, researchers rarely get the opportunity to study them first-
hand or at least in adequate temporal proximity and thus often have 
to rely on the accuracy (or not) of third party reports. As a testimony 
to how fragile this type of evidence can be, the first edition of Ring 
and Cooper’s mindsight monograph (1999) had to carry a pasted-in 
disclaimer requesting readers to ignore one impressive case history 
of mindsight because additional probing raised the suspicion that this 
case report may have been fraudulent. 
In brief, for the time being, the evidence for terminal lucidity and 
mindsight primarily refers to a few anecdotal and exceptional and oc-
casionally ambivalent case reports scattered throughout the literature 
(Batthyány, 2014). Additionally, only a fraction of these reports have 
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been written up with the research question in mind whether and un-
der which circumstances complex sensory and mental function can co-
exist with concurrent loss, decline, or disintegration of brain function. 
However, the results of Kelly at al. (2007) pose as much a challenge 
to physicalist models of the mind (and NDEs) as terminal lucidity and 
mindsight in that they, too, suggest that the conscious sense of self-
hood and complex, structured visual imagery and mental clarity can 
“outlive” even severely altered brain function—including a flatline 
EEG. But in contrast to terminal lucidity and mindsight, the continu-
ation of self and cognition despite often marked changes in supportive 
physiological parameters is the rule rather than the exception during 
NDEs. 
At the same time, however, the notion of enhanced visual imagery, 
awareness, and mentation during NDEs currently is also based on a 
limited stock of data: Until now, only one unpublished study briefly 
reported in Kelly et al. (2007, p. 386) involved systematic investiga-
tion of the frequency of self-reports of enhanced meaningful and struc-
tured imagery, awareness, and mentation during NDEs. 
In view of the implications of this phenomenon, we further explored 
self-reported cognitive and sensory function during NDEs in several 
large samples of first-person NDE accounts. Specifically, we investi-
gated the reported state and potential changes of the quality of visual 
imagery and mentation during NDEs in large and independent sam-
ples of NDE reports in order to test the replicability of Kelly et al.’s 
finding. Additionally, in order to address the question whether complex 
visual imagery and mentation may be present during times of severe 
and life threatening states, only reports of subjects with medically 
diagnosed life threatening conditions with cardiac/respiratory arrest 
were included in this study. Our goal was to examine whether NDEs 
reported in the aftermath of these most severely life-threatening cir-
cumstances evidenced preserved or enhanced mental function. 
Method
Our method consisted of simple text analysis of first person reports 
of NDEs. Reports were self-authored unsolicited volunteer narratives 
that came from four large repositories of NDE accounts. Three re-
positories were online: the database of the Near Death Experience 
Research Foundation (NDERF; www.nderf.org) with, at the time of 
our study, approximately 3,900 accounts of death- and crisis-related 
experiences; the International Association for Near- Death Studies 
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(IANDS; www.iands.org) experience repository with approximately 
290 accounts; and the Archive of Near- Death Experiences (www.near 
-death.com) with approximately 150 accounts. The fourth repository 
consisted of approximately 220 accounts of crisis experiences and 
possible NDEs from an earlier survey of ours (Saniga & Batthyány, 
2004). In total, we examined 4,572 reports—including what may have 
been a small number of duplicates or double-entries. 
The reports were pooled and electronically scanned for explicit ref-
erences to cognitive and visual function (e.g. saw, seen, vision, color, 
light, thought, thinking, idea, remember, memory). Reports that did 
not include these keywords were discarded. In a second step, the re-
maining subset of reports was scanned for references to the medical 
diagnosis and/or circumstances of the NDE (e.g. cardiac arrest, re-
spiratory arrest, resuscitation, clinical death). The remaining reports 
with matching references were then individually read, double-checked 
for inclusion criteria, and, if they passed criteria, scored (see below).
Thus, to be included, an account had to meet two criteria: (a) It 
had to include at least one explicit reference to visual perception and/
or imagery and/or mentation, for example, “I saw the car wreck from 
about 3 meters above” and/or “I thought about my children”; and (b) it 
had to contain specific clinical information about the occurrence of 
the NDE such that the experiencer was unconscious and undergoing 
a diagnosed life-threatening cardiac or respiratory arrest. Out of the 
approximately 4,500 accounts that met the first criterion, only 2,319 
carried specific medical information about the circumstances of the 
NDE, and, of those, 653 met the second criterion of a medically diag-
nosed life threatening cardiac/respiratory arrest. These 653 accounts 
were further analyzed as follows. 
Given the exploratory design of the study and both the large number 
and diverse nature of the individual accounts, and in order to enable 
comparison with Kelly et al. (2007), we chose a simple and straight-
forward scoring method. All references to (a) visual perception or im-
agery and (b) alertness or mentation were rated on scales between -2 
and +2. Protocols were coded independently by three raters in a set of 
five reports at a time until at least 85% agreement was reached. The 
agreement criterion was reached after four sets. After that point, the 
remaining protocols were coded by individual raters. Disagreements 
or uncertain ratings were resolved through discussion. Pearson cor-
relation revealed an inter-rater reliability of r = .88.
For both dimensions, i.e. visual imagery and alertness and/or men-
tation, only explicit mention of the respective dimension was scored. 
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A score of 2 signified marked change, a score of 1 slight change, and 
a score 0 no reported change in the respective dimension; the operator 
(‘+’ or ‘-’) designated qualitative increase or decrease of the respective 
dimension. For each report, each explicit reference relevant to one of 
the two dimensions was scored, and scores were then averaged so that 
for each dimension, the lowest possible average score was -2 (marked 
decline within the respective dimension) and the highest possible 
score +2 (marked enhancement in the respective dimension). 
In brief, if a report included a reference to seeing and/or thinking 
(or synonyms thereof), it was scorable on the respective dimensions. 
If the report merely referred to seeing or thinking but did not include 
any additional descriptor or direct or indirect qualifier about the qual-
ity of seeing or thinking, seeming merely to describe seeing or think-
ing in a manner comparable to everyday wakefulness, it was scored 
as 0; for example, “I saw that my dad and step-mom had a worried look 
on their faces and tried to ask why but they did not hear me,” and “I 
wondered whether this meant that I was dead and thought about my 
friends in the waiting area.” Further examples of -2 (marked decline), 
-1 (slight decline), +1 (slight enhancement), and +2 (marked enhance-
ment) appear in the Results section. 
Results
Demographic data regarding age and gender were available for only 
489 (74.9%) of the 653 cases. Subjects in this subgroup were aged 
18–74 (M = 53.7) and were 62.9% female and 37.1% male. In compari-
sons of females’ and males’ visual imagery scores as well as mentation 
scores, t tests revealed no significant differences ( p > .05); thus, for 
analyses we did not differentiate by gender. Medical precursors of the 
NDE also varied widely and included, for example, clinical death not 
otherwise specified, surgery complications, organ failure, head injury, 
suicide attempts, anaphylactic shock, drowning or diving accidents, 
and car accidents. In 504 (77.2%) of the total cases, the NDE-related 
health crisis had a sudden onset and was not preceded by chronic ill-
ness. In the remaining 22.8%, subjects indicated that they had been 
physically unwell for a longer period of time and/or had expected an 
impending deterioration of health status before their NDE-related 
crises. 
The input format for NDE reports differed considerably across the re-
positories, as some repositories included interview questions  whereas 
others merely asked subjects to describe their experience without fur-
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ther instructions. Accordingly, reports varied widely in length, preci-
sion, and density. Additionally, even within a repository, length and 
narrative structure of the reports varied considerably. Closer inspec-
tion within databases suggested that one potent factor on report length 
and descriptive depth was the length and descriptive precision of the 
immediate preceding reports of the respective entry—which were view-
able to site visitors on two of the larger databases: NDERF and IANDS. 
Visual Imagery 
Out of the entire sample, only about 41 accounts (6.2%) contained no 
explicit mention of any visual imagery but, instead, referred to inner 
affective states, mentation, and insights during the experience. These 
41 accounts were therefore not scored on the visual imagery scale, 
leaving a reduced visual imagery sample of 612 accounts. 
In this reduced sample (n = 612), only 73 (11.9%) indicated that dur-
ing at least one point in their NDE, their vision got considerably worse. 
Specifically, 18 subjects (2.9%) reported temporary loss of vision, and 
55 subjects (8.9%) indicated markedly diminished vision. In the ma-
jority of these 73 cases, the experiencers attributed their diminished 
or loss of vision to their surroundings rather than to a loss or decline 
of vision per se; for example, “I had no vision; everything was dark”; “I 
could see nothing, it was complete darkness”; “It was very dark, and I 
only saw some shadows in a distance, but could not recognize who they 
were.” Additionally, only eight subjects (1.3% of the reduced sample; 
10.9% of the diminished-vision group) reported loss, but not regain, 
of vision during their NDEs. The remaining 65 (10.6% of the reduced 
sample; 89.1% of the diminished-vision sample) of those subjects who 
reported momentarily diminished or lost vision said that later in their 
NDEs, they experienced either a return of vision or an enhancement 
of visual imagery, such as when they experienced what appeared to 
them to be visually vivid scenery or encounters with deceased rela-
tives, nonhuman persons, and/or lights. For example: 
I was in the midst of utter warm darkness, nothing, only nothing. I 
was unafraid, but it was total darkness and warmth. After a while, 
I saw a tiny little ray of light piercing the darkness, then two, then 
dozens of them, and soon found myself bathing in multi-colored light 
rays. It was the most extraordinary thing I ever saw. Not only ‘seeing’ 
it, actually, but living in it. 
Visual imagery rating of those 65 subjects who reported a return of 
vision after a temporary loss or decline showed that 42 (64.6%) indi-
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cated slightly enhanced vision (a score of +1), and 23 (35.4%) indicated 
marked improvement of vision (+2), with none recounting a return of 
normal, vision. 
The majority of subjects in the entire reduced sample who explicitly 
mentioned visual imagery—539 (88% of the visual imagery sample)—
made no reference to such a temporary loss or decline of visual ability. 
Of these, 252 (41.1% of the scored sample) were scored 0 as they did 
not explicitly mention of change in visual quality but merely reported 
visual experiences without any additional qualifier. The remaining 
287 subjects (46.9%) reported either a mild (149 subjects; 24.4%) or a 
marked (139 subjects; 22.5%) improvement of their vision during their 
NDEs. For example, these narratives scored +2: “No need for glasses 
anymore! I saw perfectly well without them,” and
It was entirely different than ‘seeing’ as you would define it. ‘Seeing’ 
there is in entirety. The images were created in my knowing through 
great vibrations, all energy expressing itself through different fre-
quencies. Light was used to send thoughts into me, which then formed 
images, but not before my eyes, in my mind as though I had seen it. 
Cognition
Fewer subjects spontaneously mentioned state and quality of cogni-
tion than reported visual imagery. Out of the entire sample of 653 
experiences, about a third (226 accounts; 34.6%) contained no explicit 
mention of cognitive processes during the experience. A majority of 
these reports (191 cases; 84.5%), however, contained explicit or implied 
reference to often complex content at least suggestive of normal cogni-
tive functioning. For example: “It was so beautiful but I also longed 
to be with my children. Leaving them alone at this early age seemed 
overwhelmingly painful.” The following analyses refer to the reduced 
sample of the remaining 427 reports that contained explicit references 
to alertness and mentation, as only these could be scored according to 
the scoring scheme. 
Only one single subject (0.23%) indicated a marked decrease of 
alertness and mentation:
I just felt as if half asleep. Whenever ‘I woke up’ during the time I was 
out of my body, I found the outlook of survival simply too tiring and 
not very exciting at all and fell back into what I would compare to a 
fitful half-sleep. 
Two subjects (0.46%) reported a slight decline in mentation, but 
not in alertness: “Very present and awake, but also extremely relaxed. 
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My thinking was strangely viscous and slow. [. . .] I simply wanted to 
watch this beautiful warm yellowish light”; 
I felt peaceful, receptive. Was totally empty, but in a very positive and 
elated way. ‘Finally I am at home’— I repeated over and over again 
like a mantra. Nothing much happened inside me—all happened out 
there and I watched and was happy.
Eleven subjects (25.8%) indicated that they were in a trance- or 
dream-like state of consciousness with strong affective connotations 
but with what appeared to be slight declines in alertness or mentation: 
“The journey felt like a dream, but it wasn’t a dream and the feel-
ings were extremely intense, but dreamy”; “it reminded me of my stu-
dent days when we took acid: mind-blowing.” These types of responses 
were scored -1 to indicate a slight negative change in alertness and/
or cognition. 
A total of 262 subjects (61.4% of the reduced scorable sample) men-
tioned being conscious of their self, their environments, and mentation 
but did not use any further qualifying adjectives or any indication 
of either decline or enhancement of the scored dimension; these were 
scored 0. The remaining 151 subjects (35.4% of the scorable group) re-
ported slight (70; 16.4%) or marked (81; 19%) heightening of awareness 
and alertness and clearer thinking: “I felt extremely aware, totally 
present, sharp and focused. In hindsight, it’s like being half asleep 
when I was alive, and totally awake after I was pronounced dead”; 
My mind felt cleared and my thoughts seemed quick and decisive. I 
felt a great sense of freedom and was quite content to be rid of my 
body. I felt a connection with everything around me in a way that 
I cannot describe. I felt as if I was thinking faster or that time had 
slowed down considerably. 
Whereas the three subjects who reported a decline on the alertness 
and mentation dimension indicated change either in alertness or men-
tation only, but not in both (see above), we found no clear trend of such 
a separation of both concepts in either the “marked enhancement” or 
in the “slight enhancement” groups. 
Discussion
In this text analysis of a large sample of NDE narratives, we found 
that a substantial number of subjects spontaneously reported slightly 
or markedly enhanced visual imagery during their NDEs, and only a 
minority remembered loss or decline of vision, though in the majority 
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of these latter cases this reduction was attributed to the surround-
ings in which the NDErs found themselves rather than to the subjects’ 
own visual abilities per se. Additionally, the majority of those sub-
jects who reported a momentary decline in visual imagery said that as 
their NDEs unfolded in time, vision returned and frequently entailed 
complex and detailed imagery suggestive of unchanged or enhanced 
vision—and did not revert to diminished levels. Secondly, we found 
that an overwhelming majority of subjects recounted either no change 
in, or slightly or markedly enhanced alertness and mentation during 
their NDEs, and only a minority remembered a decline in mentation or 
alertness. These results did not vary by gender. Although the nature 
of the data precluded further statistical analysis, it was our informal 
observation that these results did not vary by other demographic or by 
circumstantial variables. It remains for future researchers to confirm 
or disconfirm our informal observation through formal analysis.
Comparison With Earlier Studies
The results of this study confirm and replicate Kelly et al.’s (2007) 
report on quality of thinking during NDEs with a large independent 
sample of NDErs who underwent a severe medical crisis; they addi-
tionally suggest that complex visual imagery and cognition are highly 
prevalent in the typical NDE. Together, these results indicate that in 
a majority of NDEs, both figurative and abstract mentation is either 
preserved or improved during unconsciousness and unresponsiveness 
in the context of likely respiratory and cardiac arrest.
Before we enter a discussion of how our results compare to results 
of earlier similar studies, it should be noted that our methodology—
rating of spontaneous comments on the quality of vision and cogni-
tion in brief self-reports—was expected to yield very conservative es-
timates of the scored dimensions in comparison to results generated 
by explicitly asking subjects to comment on the quality of the scored 
dimensions as Kelly et al. (2007) did. Additionally, our “no change” 
ratings differed considerably from Kelly et al.’s (2007). Given that 
we scored spontaneous reports, we had to account for the relatively 
large group of subjects who explicitly mentioned visual imagery and/
or thinking but who did not use any qualifying adjectives suggesting 
either decline or enhancement. As these reports included no mention 
of change on the mentation dimension, we scored these neutral reports 
as 0, i.e., no explicit reference to change. But as Greyson pointed out, 
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“failing to use further adjectives is not the same as reporting alert-
ness or mentation as normal; it is just a failure to specify whether 
cognition was normal, enhanced or diminished” (B. Greyson, personal 
communication, September 20, 2015). It is therefore very likely that 
our scoring method inflated the frequency of “no change” ratings. In 
contrast, Kelly et al.’s subjects received a no-change rating if they 
explicitly stated that functionality of the scored dimension was “as 
usual,” that is, not much different from everyday waking life. Hence 
our and Kelly et al.’s “no change” groups are not directly comparable.
In Kelly et al.’s (2007) sample, 52.2% reported that their vision “got 
clearer than usual,” 32.2% described their vision as “as clear as usual,” 
and 5.6% as “not as clear as usual” (B. Greyson, personal communi-
cation, September 20, 2015). In our sample of unprompted reports of 
change in visual imagery during the NDE, 46.9% described a slight 
or marked enhancement of visual imagery, 41.1% mentioned visual 
imagery without any further qualifier—thus receiving a score of 0, 
and 11.9% indicated a temporary decline or loss of vision—which in 
most cases experiencers attributed to external circumstances rather 
than to a decline of visual ability per se. Hence despite differences in 
scoring methods, the results of our study roughly replicate Kelly et 
al.’s results on this dimension. 
Secondly, Kelly et al. (2007) reported that 45% of their subjects 
indicated that their thinking was clearer than usual, and 35% of ex-
periencers described their thinking “as clear as usual”; thus 80% of 
their subjects indicated either no change or enhancement in cogni-
tion. Additionally, Jeffrey Long (J. Long, personal communication, 
September 16, 2015) found that in a group of 1,122 contributors to the 
NDERF repository, when directly asked, “How did your highest level 
of consciousness and alertness during the experience compare to your 
normal every day consciousness and alertness?”, 74.4% reported “more 
consciousness and alertness,” 20.4% reported unchanged conscious-
ness and alertness during their NDEs, and only 5.2% described their 
consciousness and alertness as less than normal 
As to be expected with our scoring method, we found a substan-
tially higher rate of unrated or presumably unchanged (61.4%) men-
tation, but we also found a surprisingly large number of spontane-
ous reports of enhanced (35.4%) alertness and mentation during the 
NDE, whereas only 3.3% reported a downturn in alertness and men-
tation. Although results of both studies are somewhat similar, our 
data pointed to a higher incidence of no change in cognition during 
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NDEs—with a difference of 26 percentage points—which is not sur-
prising given the difference between the studies in operationalization 
of “no change.” 
At the same time, our results are even more striking if one takes into 
account that reports of changes in the scored dimensions were mostly 
spontaneous and unprompted. Whereas a number of researchers have 
implicated expectancy effects to influence the narratives of NDE ac-
counts (Belanti, Perera, & Jagadheesan, 2008; Kellehear, 1993; Knob-
lauch, Schmied, & Schnettler, 2001), it is unlikely that such effects un-
duly influenced or biased the results reported here. Enhanced visual 
ability, alertness, and mentation do not seem to be central elements 
of the classical NDE narrative. Additionally, as pointed out in the 
results section, a number of accounts clearly indicated that subjects 
were engaging in often highly complex integrative cognitive process-
ing during their NDEs and yet did not explicitly comment on changes 
in alertness or mentation. Others did not explicitly indicate change in 
visual processing, and yet their accounts included often highly com-
plex and vivid visual imagery—such as otherworldly landscapes or 
colors never seen before. Though in both cases it is reasonable to infer 
that visual imagery and alertness or mentation were either unchanged 
or enhanced during the NDEs, we nonetheless refrained from scoring 
such accounts on the respective dimensions and, thus again, risked 
under- rather than overestimation of changes in the two scored dimen-
sions. The trade-off between caution and false-negatives was not the 
only limitation of this study, however. 
Limitations
Like every retrospective survey study, this study, too, has a number 
of shortcomings and limitations, which we shall address next. First of 
all, the accounts used in this study were not elicited in order to study 
the dependent variables investigated in the foregoing analyses—which 
again is more likely to have led to under- rather than to over-reporting 
of changes in these dimensions—that is, Type II rather than Type I 
error. Our results are therefore likely to provide an overly conserva-
tive estimate of the developments in the dimensions in our sample. 
Secondly, respondents were self-selected volunteers and thus may 
not have been representative of NDErs as a whole. Although we cannot 
rule out that our results were somehow biased by the self-selection of 
subjects, a growing number of researchers have found that online sur-
veys and repositories generate data as reliable and valid, and some-
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times even more so, than data generated by more traditional interview 
methods (Lindhjem & Navrud, 2011; Riva, Teruzzi & Anolli, 2003; 
Weigold, Weigold & Russell, 2013). 
Still, we cannot rule out that one or another of the accounts in-
cluded in our sample might have been fraudulent or fake; however, on 
NDERF, the largest contributor of NDEs studied here, less than 1% of 
posted NDEs have been removed due to concerns about their validity 
(J. Long, personal communication, September 27, 2015; see also Long 
& Long, 2003). Additionally, given the sheer number of accounts, it 
is unlikely that fake reports have significantly biased our results in 
one or the other direction. One would expect fake accounts either to 
be nonsensical—in which case the report wouldn’t have met inclusion 
criteria—or, if the fake was an intentional fraud, to be prototypical of 
the popular NDE narrative. As pointed out above, however, enhanced 
visual imagery, alertness, and mentation do not seem to be central 
elements of the popular NDE narrative; hence, one might reasonably 
infer that fake reports would not have over-proportionally indicated 
change in the dimensions investigated in this study. Thus, whereas it 
is possible that some fake reports might have passed our inclusion cri-
teria, they are unlikely to have significantly affected our main results. 
A third potential weakness of our study concerns inclusion criteria, 
such as the medical conditions related to the NDEs. We tried to apply 
strict inclusion criteria, such as clear indication of respiratory and/or 
cardiac arrest, and therefore discarded a large number of reports that, 
although they included detailed medical information suggestive of life-
threatening conditions, did not elaborate sufficiently on cardiac and 
respiratory status. We thus excluded an indefinite number of accounts 
that, under more lenient inclusion criteria, would have deserved to be 
analyzed. One potential criticism is that perhaps our inclusion cri-
teria may have skewed results towards particularly detailed reports 
in general, and subjects who gave more detailed and longer reports 
about their medical status during their NDEs might have therefore 
also over-reported (in comparison to a more representative sample) 
visual imagery and mentation. 
To address this concern, we conducted informal test scorings of 40 
randomly selected accounts that included some medical information—
but not sufficient for inclusion—which were suggestive of a severe 
health crisis during the NDEs, but found no indication that results 
would have been different had we included less detailed accounts. In 
fact, given that cardiac arrests are often followed by post-arrest confu-
sion and amnesia (Aminoff, Scheinman, Griffin, & Herre, 1988), it is 
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again likely that our strict inclusion criteria skewed results towards 
under- rather than over-reporting of positive changes in mentation 
and visual imagery during the NDEs in our sample. 
Fourth, it must be conceded that our scoring dimensions were fairly 
crude. For example, throughout this study, we consistently were con-
fronted with the question of whether and how we were to distinguish 
between visual ability (i.e. ‘seeing’) and visual imagery (i.e. the ‘seen’); 
in the end we had to recognize that with retrospective reports of the 
kind studied here, any distinction of this kind would have been far 
too ambiguous and uncertain to add exploratory value to this study. 
In comparison to, for example, the more impressive and perhaps also 
evidential mindsight cases—veridical perception during the NDEs 
of people with physical blindness—our visual imagery findings are 
therefore certainly less compelling. But they are considerably more 
frequent, and it should be remembered that the purpose of our analy-
sis was not to investigate the veracity of visual perceptions during 
the NDE but, rather, to examine the question whether complex and 
structured—that is, meaningful and coherent—visual imagery can 
occur in the presence of severe physiological crisis and, presumably, 
cerebral dysfunction. For this question, we found strong support. 
The same objective guided the choice of our second dimension: alert -
ness and mentation. Clearly, both elements of this dimension are re-
lated, yet evidently they are distinguishable—the former referring to 
a state, the latter to functions and processes. Accordingly, at the be-
ginning of this study we originally planned to distinguish between the 
two elements and score them separately. However, it turned out that 
here, too, we could not easily uphold this distinction without convolut-
ing analysis at the cost of precision. Very few accounts allowed for a 
clear distinction between self-reported changes in alertness on the one 
hand and mentation on the other hand—with the exception of the tiny 
fraction of reports that indicated a marked decrease of alertness and/
or mentation. 
Within the framework of this study, however, it was the unchanged, 
slight, or marked increase in alertness and mentation during cardiac 
and/or respiratory arrest-related NDEs that was of interest to us; 
again, we found strong support for the notion of normal to enhanced 
alertness and thought in a substantial number of NDErs pre-selected 
on the basis of the severity of their health condition during their 
NDEs, thus replicating earlier results with a large sample of over 650 
individual case reports. 
Last but not least, it should also be noted that retrospective stud-
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ies such as this one leave open the possibility that the NDEs—and 
with them, the continuity or enhancement of the scored dimensions—
occurred during the peak of their health crises, that is, during car-
diac or respiratory arrest or perhaps shortly thereafter when pre-
sumably cerebral function was more structured and stable and thus 
supportive of clear(er) consciousness, thinking, and sense of selfhood. 
We cannot rule out that an undetermined number of the experiences 
(or parts of some of the experiences) analyzed in this study may have 
taken place in close proximity, but not, or not only, precisely during 
the physiological insult. However, shortly after cardiac or respiratory 
arrest, brain function and cognitive function are known to be severely 
compromised, and subjects are typically confused and amnesic about 
events immediately preceding and following the peak of the health cri-
sis (Aminoff et al., 1988). Thus, even if an indefinite number of reports 
may have referred to visual and cognitive function briefly after, rather 
than during, the crisis, the restriction of including only cases of car-
diac or respiratory failure is likely to have worked against rather than 
for finding such a high proportion of unprompted reports of contin-
ued or enhanced visual imagery and mentation during the NDEs—or 
memories thereof after the NDEs. 
Moreover, one may compare our findings to awareness during an-
esthesia—especially considering that the majority of subjects in this 
study were in emergency treatment during their health crisis and 
hence likely to have received anesthetics and/or sedatives. However, 
the stark differences between cognitive status in NDEs and dur-
ing anesthesia suggest that lucidity during NDEs and awareness in 
anesthesia or similar states are two very different phenomena. For 
instance, in contrast to awareness during or immediately after car-
diac and respiratory arrest, awareness during general anesthesia is 
extremely rare—9–18% vs. 0.1–0.5%, respectively, and, phenomeno-
logically, in contrast to the normal or enhanced cognitive function re-
ported by a substantial proportion of our subjects, memory following 
anesthesia usually consists of a vague auditory recall or a sense of 
dreaming (Myles, Leslie, McNeil, Forbes, & Chan, 2004). Addition-
ally, memories of awareness during general anesthesia may take 
several days to weeks to become consciously accessible (Nordstrom, 
Engstrom, Persson, & Sandin 1997), whereas NDEs are usually re-
called immediately upon return of full functional consciousness, and 
memories of the experience are remarkably stable and consistent even 
years after the experience (Greyson, 2007; van Lommel, van Wees, 
Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001). The available evidence thus indicates that 
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there is something rather unique about consciousness during NDEs in 
comparison to consciousness in related conditions. 
Conclusions
In sum, despite of the presence of a number of methodological factors 
that, in all likelihood, skewed results towards underestimation of no 
or positive changes in the scored dimensions, we found in this study a 
strikingly large number of mostly unprompted, spontaneous reports of 
continuation or slight or marked enhancement in visual imagery and 
mentation during the NDEs of a group of subjects who would otherwise 
have been expected to suffer from loss or deterioration in cognitive, 
sensory, and memory function during as well as in the aftermath of a 
cardiac and/or respiratory arrest. The results of this study therefore 
indicate that the conscious sense of selfhood and complex, structured 
visual imagery and mental clarity can, under certain circumstances, 
“outlive” even severely altered brain function—including a flatline 
EEG or post-arrest trauma. Hence, converging with the related phe-
nomena of terminal lucidity and mindsight, these data indicate the 
possibility of the continuation of self and mental function despite often 
marked decline in supportive physiological parameters. In contrast to 
the comparatively rare incidents of mindsight and terminal lucidity, 
however, our results suggest that the continuity of visual imagery, 
mentation, and sense of selfhood is the rule rather than the exception 
during NDEs. 
Together with case studies of terminal lucidity and mindsight, our 
findings of enhanced mentation and visual imagery during severe 
physiological crises appear to therefore indicate that, at least near 
death, the relationship between cognition, perception, and their neu-
ronal correlates might be more complex than traditionally thought. 
Specifically, the findings reported here and in earlier studies do not 
square well with physicalist reductionist models of the mind but, 
prima facie, appear to support the alternative dualist proposition 
that at least during extraordinary intervening circumstances such as 
the dying process, mind and brain may emerge as two different enti-
ties with separable, or indeed separate, functions (Elitzur, 2009). As 
briefly pointed out in the introduction, the basic argument for a dual-
ist interpretation is relatively straightforward: According to physical-
ist theories of the mind, conscious awareness, selfhood, and mentation 
are products of, or identical with, their respective neuronal correlates 
(Crick & Koch, 1990; Place, 1956). Within this framework, NDEs, too, 
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are held to be caused by neurophysiological processes at or around the 
dying process (Augustine, 2007), such as cerebral anoxia (Lempert, 
Bauer, & Schmidt, 1994), cerebral hypoxia (Blackmore & Troscianko, 
1988), cerebral hypercarbia, releases of endorphins (Carr, 1981), or 
glutamate release accompanied by blockades of NMDA receptors (Jan-
sen, 1989). The findings reported in this paper and cases of terminal 
lucidity and mindsight, however, appear to suggest otherwise in that 
they indicate the presence of complex and structured conscious expe-
rience during decline, breakdown, or absence of the neurobiological 
correlates commonly held to be causative factors of NDEs—and of con-
scious experience in general.
As Greyson (2010) pointed out, 
the most important objection to the adequacy of all reductionist psy-
chophysiological theories . . . is mental clarity, vivid sensory imagery, 
a clear memory of the experience, and a conviction that the experi-
ence seemed more real than ordinary consciousness are the norm for 
NDEs, even when they occur in conditions of drastically altered cere-
bral physiology under which the reductionist model would deem con-
sciousness impossible (p. 39). 
The results of this study therefore underscore the call to further 
study the mechanisms behind the seeming continuation of a conscious 
sense of selfhood and complex, structured visual imagery and mental 
clarity during altered brain function and severely deteriorating physi-
ological activity in general—and perhaps especially during clinical 
death. Clearly, further systematic investigation of this phenomenon 
is warranted, especially given its implications for the question of the 
authenticity of NDEs and the relationship of mind and brain at death. 
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